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fide lienors of importer,13 purchasers from dealer with notice,1 4
mortgagee with notice,' 5 and as against the dealer himself.' 0
In the principal case the court based its decision on the ground
that no credit was extended to the bankrupt while the trust receipt
remained unrecorded. When the court refused to restrict the use-
fulness of the trust receipt by bringing it within the purview of the
local conditional sales recording act, it followed the general trend of
the state17 and federal' s decisions and preserved the integrity of the
trust receipt as a commercially desirable financing device.
It seems desirable to uphold the trust receipt as a highly useful
independent security device in financing both foreign and domestic
purchases, and at the same time give creditors of and purchasers
from the importer or dealer notice of its use. To this end it has
been suggested that, instead of requiring the recordation of each
individual trust receipt, the general plan of financing under which
the goods are purchased be recorded, once and for all.' 9
F. D. HAMRICK, JiR.
Taxation-Constitutionality of Income Allocation Formulae
as Applied to Corporations.
The North Carolina allocation formula for determining the tax-
able income of a foreign corporation was, in a recent Federal
Supreme Court decision,' held to result in a tax on income not rea-
T. D. Downing Co. v. Shawmut Corp., 245 Mass. 106, 139 N. E. 525
(1923) (not classified); International Trust Co. v. Webster Nat'l Bank, 258
Mass. 17, 154 N. E. 330 (1926) (not classified) ; cf. Century Throwing Co. v.
Muller, 197 Fed. 252 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1912).
"Ohio Savings Bank & Trust Co. v. Schneider, supra note 7 (trust receipt
as conditional sale).
"Commercial Credit Co. v. Schleglelstorseth Motor Co., 23 S. W. (2d)
702 (Tex. App. 1930) (not classified).
"Industrial Finance Co. v. Turner, 215 Ala. 460, 110 So. 904 (1926) (trust
receipt as conditional sale) ; Commercial Credit Co. v. Peak, 195 Cal. 27, 231
Pac. 340 (1924) (trust receipt as bailment) ; Brown v. Green Hickey Leather
Co., 244 Mass. 169, 138 N. E. 714 (1923) (not classified).
"Cases cited, supra note 2.
"Cases cited, supra note 3.
"Void, Trust Receipts Security in Financing Sales (1930) 15 ConR. L. Q.
543.
'Hans Rees' Sons Inc. v. State of North Carolina ex rel Maxwell, 51
Sup. Ct. 385 (April 13, 1931). Appellant, a New York corporation, operated
a leather tannery in North Carolina. It applied to the Commissioner of
Revenue for the readjustment of its income tax assessment. Revision was
disallowed, and appeal taken to the Superior Court where evidence was ex-
cluded which would have shown the corporation's income to be divided into
profits from buying, manufacturing, and selling, and that only 17 per cent of
the entire net profit was due to manufacturing within North Carolina, but 80
NOTES AND COMMENTS
sonably attributable to business within the state. The tax was 4Y2
per cent of such proportion of the corporation's entire net income as
the value of its tangible property in North Carolina was to the value
of all its tangible property.2 The corporation admitted that the
allocation was in full accord with the statute. Its sole contention was
that the formula as applied in this case was arbitrary and unreason-
able and violated the commerce and due process clauses. The state
court was of opinion that the corporation was a unitary business and
the statutory formula was an equitable method of allotting income to
business within the state3 The Supreme Court rejected the formula,
for there was evidence of three distinct sources of income, buying
profit, manufacturing profit, and selling profit, and there was con-
siderable discrepancy between the income derived from the one North
Carolina activity, manufacturing, and the income assigned North
Carolina by the statute.
The formula in question had been approved in its application in
Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberldan,4 and the state court re-
lied on that case to validate the tax. 'the Supreme Court, however,
said that there was not in the Underwood case evidence to show that
business within the taxing state did not produce the income allocated
to it by the formula, whereas such evidence was offered in the pres-
ent instance.
Because few corporations have accounting systems that can show
the income derived from each economic activity, formulae are de-
signed to apportion a part of the income to the taxing jurisdiction
by comparison with a constant factor.5 The formulae often reach a
per cent of its tangible property was located in North Carolina, with the result
that the formula allotted 80 per cent of the income to this state. The state
Supreme Court sustained the ruling of the trial court striking out this evi-
dence, but said that if the evidence were deemed competent, it would not
change the result.
'N. C. ANN. CODE (Michie Supp., 1929) §7880 (317). Formula applicable
to corporations deriving profits from dealing in tangible property.
199 N. C. 42, 153 S. E. 850 (1930).
'254 U. S. 113, 41 Sup. Ct. 45, 65 L. ed. 165 (1920). The court indicated
that if it were shown that a formula caused actual injustice it would be re-jected. "We have no occasion to consider whether the rule prescribed if ap-
plied under different conditions might be obnoxious to the constitution.";
Notes (1920) 20 COL. L. Ray. 324; (1920) 29 YALE L. J. 512; (1920) 33 HARv.
L. REv. 736
'Of the factors used in allocating income of manufacturing corporations
tangible property and gross sales receipts are the more common. For other
factors see infra note 8; see 2 STATE INCOME TAXEs 113, NATIoNAL INDUs-
TRiAL CoinERNcE BoARD (1930) ; Isaacs, The Unit Rule (1926) 35 YALE L. J.
838.
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fair distribution, but they sometimes operate unevenly.0 North Caro-
lina's formula, with property the constant factor, is well adapted to
yield revenue in this state, which consumes a relatively small propor-
tion of its manufactured goods. However, the North Carolina for-
mula is extireme in the inclusion of only one factor and may result
inequitably more often than a formula which embodies other elements
of business in addition to property.7 Such a formula which attrib-
utes most of the income to the manufacturing jurisdiction may pos-
sibly be justified on the ground that it is the manufacturing element
which in ultimate economics produces the income, and buying and
selling are more incidental. Also a tax allocated by manufacturing
will enure to the benefit of those producing the goods who are resi-
dents of the taxing state, while frequently purchases and sales en-
tered into in a large number of states are concluded at a central office.
A tax levied there, measured by sales, will usually benefit a small
group of employees only incidentally engaged in producing the in-
come. Without such justification the North Carolina statute is un-
fortunate, and the more so since it is mandatory. In a number of
states the tax authorities are empowered to set aside the formula and
substitute a method which will with greater accuracy ascertain the
income earned within the state. The Hans Rees' case, presenting a
discrepancy of 60 per cent between the statutory method and the cor-
poration's accounting, is palpably a situation demanding discretion-
ary power in the tax authorities.
The North Carolina formula could be improved by including sev-
'If the corporation owns property only in North Carolina, this state will
tax the entire net income although the corporation may do as much business
in other states in leased premises. A result of unfair allocation fractions may
be the organization of separate corporations to conduct the various activities.
A corporation will be organized to buy and will contract with the manufac-
turing corporation, which in turn will be linked by contract with a sales cor-
poration, and the corporation with the most profitable contract will be located
in a state with favorable income tax laws or in one with no income tax law
at all. If these corporations are given sufficient autonomy the tax authorities
may find it difficult to reach their true earnings. See, Palmolive Co. v. Con-
way, 43 F. (2d) 226 (W. D. Wis. 1930); Buick Motor Co. v. City of Mil-
waukee, 43 F. (2d) 385 (E. D. Wis. 1930), aff'm'd. C. C. A. 7th, 6 U. S. Daily
448 (April 23, 1931) ; Breckenridge, Tax Escape by Manipulations of Holding
Company (1931) 9 N. C. L. REv. 189; Magill, 'Allocation of Income by Cor-
porate Contract (1931) 44 HARv. L. REv. 935. Income allocation formulae
rejected in Standard Oil Co. of Indiana v. Thoresen, 29 F. (2d) 708 (C. C. A.
8th, 1928)-; Standard Oil Co. of Indiana v. Wisconsin Tax Commission, 197
Wis. 630, 223 N. W. 85 (1929); see Gorham Mfg. Co. v. Travis, 274 Fed.
975 (S. D. N. Y. 1911); Fisher v. Standard Oil Co., 12 F. (2d) 744 (C. C. A.
8th, 1926).
UInfra note 8.
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eral material factors of business.8 Wisconsin utilizes an arithmetical
average of three factors, property, manufacturing cost, and sales. 9
Since allocation at best is but an average, this formula by taking into
account three important elements, reduces the probability of unjust
allocation. The.Wisconsin authorities are authorized to omit ally
one of the three factors when it is shown to their satisfaction that
its use would give an unreasonable final average, because the cor-
poration does not to an appreciable extent employ the element. This
seems to mean that the taxpayer takes the initiative to have the factor
omitted. It would seem desirable to empower the tax authorities as
well to initiate the move to omit the factor when including it would
prejudice the state's interest.10
Two other methods of avoiding the Hans Rees' situation and em-
ployed in several states are: (1) discretionary power in the tax
authorities to entirely depart from the formula and set up a new
method apposite to the particular corporation;" (2) discretionary
power to accept the separate accounting of the corporation showing
the income within the state.' 2 The first of these may be inexpedient
'The proposed 1931 Budget Revenue Bill, §311, provided that the formula
be an arithmetical average of two factors, tangible property and manufactur-
ing expenses, the latter to include cost of goods, payroll, and manufacturing
overhead. The model plan of the National Tax Association utilizes two fac-
tors, for a mercantile or manufacturing business one-half the income to be
allocated by ratio of tangible property within the state to total tangible prop-
erty, and one-half by ratio of business within to total business. "Business" in-
cludes costs of labor, goods, materials and supplies, and receipts from sales.
PROCEEDINGS NATIONAL TAX AssociroN (1922) 198; 2 STATE INCOME TAXES
120, NATIONAL I14DUSTRIAL CONFERENCE BOARD (1930). North Dakota has in
effect adopted this formula, N. D. CoMP. LAWS ANN. (Supp. 1925) §2346a6.
States which use three or more factors, CAL. STAT. (1929) c. 13, §10, property,
sales, payroll, purchases, expenses of manufacture; MAss. GEN. LAWS (1921)
c. 63, §38, property sales, payroll; Mo. LAws (1929) §13106, sales, intrastate
business, interstate business; N. Y. LAWS (1929) c. 385, §214, property, certain
accounts receivable, shares of stock of other corporations owned; VA. CODE
ANN. (Supp. 1926), Tax Bill, §10 (7), and Wis. STAT. (1927) §71.02,-prop-"
erty, sales, manufacturing expenses.
WIS. STAT. (1927) §71.02.
"
0Example, corporation takes orders in taxing state for goods to be shipped
from factory in that state to the purchaser, the contract stipulating that it is
subject to confirmation at office without the state and the sale to take place
there.1 1Aan. AcTs (1929) Act 118, §15; CAL. STAT. (1929) c. 13, §10; GA. LAWS
(1929) H. B. 143, §14; MASS. GEN. LAWS 1921) c. 63, §42; MIss. ANN. CODE
(Hemingway, 1927) §5663; N. Y. CONS. LAWS ANN. (Supp. 1927) c. 61, §211;
N. D. CoMp. LAws ANN. (Supp. 1925) §2346a7; ORE. LAws (1929) c. 427,
§7; TENN. ANN. CODE (Supp. 1926) §723a14; VA. CODE ANN. (Supp. 1926)
Tax Bill §10 (7) ; WIS. STAT. (1927) §71.02.
"ARK. ACTS (1929) Act 118, §15 and regulations; GA. LAWS (1929) H. B.
143; MAss. GEN. LAWS (1921) c. 63, §42; Miss. ANN. CODE (Hemingway,
1927) §5663; Mo. LAws (1929) §13106; MONT. REV. CODE (1921) §2298, re-
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because of the uncertainty as to the basis of allocation from year to
year, which is objectionable from the viewpoint of management. Al-
location by separate accounting will usually produce a figure very
favorable to the corporation, and, though its acceptance is discre-
tionary with the tax officials, they may be inclined in any doubtful
case to accept the accounting without complete investigation. An-
other means of avoiding allocation by rigid formula, would be the
enacting of several formulae and empowering the tax authorities to
apply the one suited to the corporation.18 The objection of uncer-
tainty equally applies here.14 The Wisconsin formula is not only
definite but there is also the advantage of a restricted discretion in
order to prevent manifest injustice.
It is believed this discretion in the authorities is constitutional. 15
Although legislative powers are not generally delegable, the ascer-
taining of net earnings is properly an administrative detail which, it
is believed, can be delegated. The legislature dictates its intent that
income from business within the state be taxed 42 per cent, and
determining the most equitable method of arriving at net income is a
detail to accomplish that intent.
In the absence of any discretion in the North Carolina officials
the result of the Hans Rees' case raises an awkward problem. Under
the decision the allocation formula cannot be used for that cor-
poration, and the tax officials have no power to depart from the for-
mula.' 6 Thus it seems that the corporation will, under the present
law, escape taxation. Other corporations might raise. the question of
unequal taxation for here is one which. is not taxed at all.
E. M. PERKINS.
quired; S. C. LAws (1927) Act 1; VA. CODE ANN. (Supp. 1926) Tax Bill,
§10 (7); Wis. STAT. (1927) §71.02.
It does not appear that any state has this method.
"However, corporations might be classified and a formula be enacted for
each class. This would narrow the chances of disparity incidental to a single
formula for all corporations. Under the present law North Carolina has three
classifications, corporations dealing in tangible property, those dealing in in-
tangible property, and railroads and public service corporations. N. C. Arm.
CoDE (Michie Supp. 1929) §7880 (317), (318).
'Bank of Commerce v. Senter, 149 Tenn. 569, 260 S. W. 144 (1924), up-
holding Tennessee discretionary provision. See Hampton and Co. v. U. S.,
276 U. S. 394, 48 Sup. Ct. 348, 72 L. ed. 624 (1928), President's discretionary
power in administering flexible tariff; Notes (1927) 36 YALE L. J. 573; (1928)
37 YALE L. J. 1151; Frischer v. Bakelite Corp., 39 F. (2d) 247 (C. C. Cus.
and Pat. App. 1930); Interstate Commerce Comm. v. Goodrich Transit Co.,
224 U. S. 194, 32 Sup. Ct. 436, 56 L. ed. 729 (1912) ; Express Co. v. R. R.,
111 N. C. 463, 16 S. E. 393 (1892).
"" Although the tax law does not authorize the officials to depart from the
formula, it appears that they do in fact sometimes compromise with the tax-
payer.
